France and Germany are discussing proposals for a radical overhaul of the EU’s 15-year-old diplomatic service in an attempt to improve the bloc’s response to geopolitical crises. Paris, Berlin and other capitals are weighing options that include stripping powers from the bloc’s chief diplomat Kaja Kallas and her €1bn-a-year External Action Service (EEAS) and returning them to the European Commission and member states, according to five senior officials briefed on the discussions. “It is clear that [the EEAS] doesn’t work the way it should in today’s world. It is dysfunctional,” said one of the officials. “The problem is structural and so the structure needs to be rebuilt.” In recent years, the EU has been roiled by the wars in Ukraine and Iran, the whims of US President Donald Trump and the rising use of tariffs, economic coercion and energy supplies as foreign policy tools, with many questioning whether the EEAS is up to the task of coordinating effective responses.

The proposal, which would reverse the aims of a 16-year-old decision to create the EEAS as an autonomous service, is one of several options detailed in a French government assessment shared with other member states. One idea proposed by Paris is to limit the autonomy of the top diplomat — currently a double-hatted role answering to member states and the Commission — and loosen her control over the network of more than 140 delegations that the EEAS operates in countries around the world. “Capitals are annoyed and want an effective way for us to act in unison externally,” said another of the officials. “There’s a real risk that the [EEAS] gets torn apart.” Proponents of restructuring the diplomatic service believe it is feasible without changing the EU treaty, which states that the EEAS should “assist” the top diplomat under terms agreed by member states and dating back to 2010. Any changes to those terms would require unanimous support from the EU’s 27 member states. In an email to EEAS staff sent on Thursday afternoon, Kallas referenced the FT’s reporting and said she “welcome[s] this debate” on the relationship between the EEAS, the Commission and EU member states, adding: “We also all know that the system could work better and without [sic] less duplication here in Brussels.” “Given the unprecedented geopolitical challenges we face, it is only natural that these discussions attract renewed attention and take on greater intensity,” Kallas wrote in the email, seen by the FT. “My commitment is to a strong EEAS that provides for a stronger European foreign and security policy. I see my peers among the [foreign] ministers wanting the same.”

Several countries have argued in private that there is too much overlap and a lack of co-ordination between the EEAS, national foreign ministries and the external relations directorates of the Commission and Council, the officials said. Those concerns have been exacerbated by Kallas’ seemingly speaking her own mind on issues such as EU-China relations and making proposals that had not yet been approved by capitals. At the same time, the EEAS and the Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen are locked in a fight for primacy over foreign and security issues. Von der Leyen — a former German defence minister — has moved her role beyond its traditional parameters by operating a self-proclaimed “geopolitical Commission”, appointing the bloc’s first defence commissioner and routinely taking the lead on the bloc’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. She has also explored setting up an intelligence-sharing unit similar to one that already exists within the EEAS — an idea Kallas opposes.

Three of the officials said the EEAS overhaul could also be influenced by ongoing discussions over the bloc’s next shared budget, where many member states are demanding cost savings and streamlined processes in Brussels. Moving EEAS powers to directorates inside the Commission and Council could save money by slashing posts, the officials said. Drafting sanctions lists and proposals for military missions, for instance, could be shifted to the Council, while day-to-day diplomacy would be overseen by the Commission. Ideas about how to reshape the EU foreign service are also being factored into the drafting of a new security strategy set to be published by the Commission this summer, two of the officials said. The French assessment of potential remedies, which is preliminary, is being discussed bilaterally at senior levels between EU governments and is one of multiple options floated about the future of the EEAS, the officials said. Paris has been clear that all the options have pros and cons. The Élysée Palace declined to comment.

A representative for Kallas told the FT that she is “fully focused on delivering on her mandate”, adding: “An important part of it is further strengthening both the EEAS and the Commission for implementing the treaties in the field of external action and the common foreign and security policy.” The French foreign ministry said on Thursday: “There is indeed a discussion about the future of the EEAS, but this reflection and reform process must come only from the High Representative and her own team. France will be there to accompany and support it, as it has always done.” When asked by the FT about the proposals, a German official said: “In a changing world, it’s clear we need a stronger EU, and a stronger EU foreign policy arm. That is why, since the creation of the EEAS, we have striven and continue to strive for improving our decision-making processes and strengthening our joint foreign policy.” The EEAS is also conducting studies internally about potential reform ideas, the officials added. Stefan Lehne, a former EU official who is now a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, said: “If you look at the development of EU foreign policy over the past five years, it is quite clear that the results have not been positive.” “There is a need to respond to the negative environment all around, and institutional change is one way to do this,” Lehne added. “It would be strange not to adjust the instruments and structure to the new reality that the EU faces today.”

France faces a different challenge from Germany and Poland, which have ample funding for equipment but struggle to attract enough personnel to meet force targets, according to Justel. The French Army has “more than enough” recruitment candidates, and last year declined to recruit the equivalent of a regiment due to budgetary constraints, the deputy chief said in a briefing here on Thursday. European NATO members have lifted defense budgets following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and as the United States pushes for allies to take on more conventional defense. While many countries including France are expanding reserve forces, Germany and Poland also plan to grow active-duty personnel by tens of thousands in coming years, with measures such as higher pay to make military service more attractive. “We have completely asymmetrical situations,” Justel said. “I see in Poland and Germany a huge budgetary and industrial effort to acquire weapons. Now, they face enormous personnel difficulties, and having a lot of weaponry without the fighters behind it, well, that remains problematic.”

Germany aims to expand its armed forces to 260,000 active soldiers by 2035 from about 186,000 now, according to a federal law governing Bundeswehr force development, while Poland intends to increase its armed forces to 300,000 from around 210,000 in mid-2025. Meanwhile, France has a force of around 191,000 military personnel and plans to recruit 21,400 active-duty troops in 2026. Poland has high ambitions to grow its forces, “they have a real sense of urgency, but there are still difficulties recruiting,” Justel said. The Polish armed forces face intensifying competition for labor in a growing economy, with Poland having the second-lowest unemployment rate in the European Union, RAND wrote in a report last year. “In terms of human resources, we are in the opposite situation,” Justel said. “This year, we’re already slowing down recruitment because not only are we recruiting better, but we’re retaining people better.” France has one of the largest youth cohorts in Europe, with those aged 15 to 19 making up 6.2% of the population in 2024, compared with 4.7% for Germany and 5% for Poland. Meanwhile, trust in the armed forces is among the highest in France, with 84% of the French expressing trust compared with 73% of Germans and 76% of Poles, according to a Eurobarometer poll published in May.

“To see the number of young people coming to enlist, and not enlisting just to find a job, they’re joining to serve in combat units and looking to defend their country,” Justel said. “There’s a dynamic in this country, there’s a demographic that makes it possible, and there’s a mindset that makes it possible.” “When I talk with my foreign counterparts, what strikes me most is the difference in recruitment, in terms of quantity, quality, motivation, and mindset,” Justel said. “Where we’re in the opposite situation is in terms of equipment, we’re not sufficiently equipped to handle a high-intensity conflict.” The French Army continues to lack spare parts and stockpiles, and has “very significant gaps” in deep fires, ground-to-air defense, counter-drone operations, and electronic warfare, according to Justel. He said France’s two most recent defense-planning laws improved the equipment situation a lot, and the Army’s armored-vehicle modernization is “progressing well,” but more is needed. Justel said France retains expertise in areas such as electronic warfare but needs to spread those capabilities more broadly across the force. The Army has identified the equivalent of about ten battalions needed to be more effective in areas including command, logistics, deep fires, drones and electronic warfare, he said.

“But there, we’re moving into a change in format, into additional capabilities,” Justel said. “So these are more long-term efforts.” The deputy commander said France’s force structure means it would be difficult for the country to permanently replace U.S. troops in parts of Europe, with the Army already “very committed” with deployments in Romania and Estonia. The French Army is instead counting on regular exercises in countries such as Finland rather than permanent basing, to ensure troops are familiar with the terrain, conditions and local friendly forces, and to be able to deploy reinforcements “quickly and effectively” the day they are needed, Justel said.

Years ago, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev described Baku’s relationship with Israel as an iceberg, with 90% hidden below the surface. Last week, CNN attempted to pull the hidden portion into full view. Notably, the report relied on four anonymous sources with apparent knowledge of highly sensitive Israeli military and intelligence activities in the greater Middle East. While CNN did not identify them, the nature of the information disclosed strongly suggests that the sources were either American, Israeli, or closely connected to the security establishments of one or both countries. According to these sources Israel secretly deployed elite military and intelligence units — including special operations forces, Mossad personnel, and heliborne rescue teams — to multiple locations in southern Azerbaijan during the recent war with Iran.

From positions just 60 miles from Tabriz, a major Iranian city in the north, Israeli commandos allegedly conducted drone operations, installed listening devices, and even helped prepare the ground for the assassination of an IRGC intelligence chief. CNN put this all in the context of other covert sites used by Israel in Iraq, the UAE, and Somaliland during the war, pointing to a ring of forward positions around Iran. Predictably, Baku reacted to the CNN report with fury. The Azerbaijani foreign ministry called the report “entirely baseless” and a violation of journalistic ethics, insisting that “Azerbaijan has never allowed, and will never allow, its territory to be used for such purposes.” Baku demanded that CNN retract what it called “unfounded allegations.” Whether or not CNN’s reporting proves fully accurate, the allegations fit a strategic relationship that has long been the subject of regional scrutiny. Israel provides Azerbaijan with advanced weapons (according to the Stockholm-based SIPRI, up to 70% of its arms imports) and buys its oil (around 40% of Israel’s consumption). Israel gets a foothold on Iran’s borders, and Azerbaijan gets the support of the powerful pro-Israel lobby in Washington. The late Quincy Institute fellow Mark Perry reported in a detailed essay in Foreign Policy as early as 2012 that Azerbaijan was “Israel’s secret staging ground” against Iran.

But why are the details being leaked now? While no official claims have been made, one possibility could be that the U.S. and Israel want to ensure Azerbaijan won’t rescind its cooperation. If so, by publicizing the alleged bases, Washington and Tel Aviv are burning Baku’s plausible deniability with Tehran. This dovetails with a pattern. After the active phase of the war, reports emerged of a secret visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the UAE. Emirati officials vehemently denied them, while their Israeli counterparts openly boasted about the trip. The leak may have been at least partially linked to Israeli domestic political considerations — Netanyahu needs to burnish his credentials as a statesman to see off a tough challenge from his main rival Naftali Bennett in elections later this year. But its effect was to further tie Abu Dhabi to Israel’s regional posture toward Iran. The same logic may apply here: tie Azerbaijan’s hands. If Iran lashes out at either UAE or Azerbaijan, or both, the logic presumably goes, they’d have to turn to Israel for protection, thus solidifying their security dependence on Tel Aviv.

So far, Tehran has shown restraint. The Iranian drone attack on Nakhchivan in March — which Aliyev called “an act of terror” — has been interpreted by Iranian sources as a warning shot, not an opening salvo for greater hostilities. Iran has avoided a northern front throughout the war, concentrating instead on the Persian Gulf and its missile exchanges with Israel. If that was indeed Tehran’s message, then it succeeded: despite his vows of retaliation, Aliyev has to date done nothing — and in fact, shipped humanitarian cargoes to Iran soon thereafter. Neither Baku nor Tehran wanted an open confrontation at that stage, but the more recent revelations can provide fuel for Tehran to act against Baku next time — if the war resumes. That is the real danger. If hostilities restart, Iran could treat Azerbaijan as a legitimate military target. Baku would then be forced to choose between full alignment with Israel — and devastating retaliation — or a break with its most important defense partner, alongside Turkey. However, there is a crucial caveat. Baku’s direct, operational involvement in specific hostile actions against Iran — such as enabling Israeli air sorties from Azerbaijan as opposed to logistical roles, such as hosting Israeli commando units that helped kill an IRGC general on Iranian soil — is a distinction that matters enormously. This could be considered a potential casus belli.

Tehran’s muted reaction so far suggests that it will first review the CNN claims carefully and reach its own conclusions. Iranian actions so far have indicated caution. Tehran is calculating: is this disclosure useful? Does it provide leverage? Or does it force Tehran’s hand before it is ready? There is also the Turkish factor. Despite recent friction, Ankara remains Baku’s steadfast ally. Iran sees Turkey as a military peer, and would not precipitate any action that would put it on a collision course with Ankara. And, as Amwaj Media’s Mohammad Ali Shabani points out, Ankara played a helpful role in restraining Kurdish groups from mounting a campaign against Iran in the opening days of the U.S.-Israeli war that was launched February 29 — a service Tehran won’t forget. All of this plays into the next steps for Tehran.

Tangentially, the CNN story is also a blow to the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) — the so-called “Caucasus Corridor” announced by the U.S. president as part of a peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia. TRIPP has been touted as a strategic wedge against Russian and Iranian influence in the South Caucasus. It is designed to link Azerbaijan overland through Armenia to its Nakhchevan exclave and Turkey, bypassing Iran. But TRIPP requires stability. The investors need to be assured that the region is a safe, neutral transit hub, not a forward operating base for Israeli commandos. A fresh crisis on its Azeri leg could scare off potential investors, already shaken by the Iran war. Despite TRIPP’s status as one of Trump’s signature peace projects that, in his view, should earn him the Nobel Peace Prize, Israel is unlikely to let Azerbaijan off very easily — Baku has become their strategic depth now. That may be the whole point of the CNN leak — whether intended or not: to make any future Azerbaijani reconciliation with Iran politically impossible. The iceberg has been mapped. Now Baku, Tehran and everyone else has to sail around it. Or try to blow it up.

France has banned Israel from participating in Eurosatory, one of the world’s largest arms shows that kicks off later this month, the Israeli government announced on Monday. “The French decision encompasses: a ban on government representatives attending the exhibition; a ban on opening an Israeli national pavilion; and a restriction limiting Israeli defense industries to displaying air defense products only, with offensive systems explicitly excluded,” the Israeli defense ministry said in a statement. “As a result, the [Israeli defense ministry] will be unable to participate in the exhibition or establish a national pavilion,” the statement added. An official from the French armed forces ministry confirmed the ban to POLITICO and said Israeli companies that showcase air and missile defense systems only will be allowed to attend.

Eurosatory starts on June 15 in Villepinte, in the Paris region. The arms fair is a chance for the world’s largest weapons-makers, including Germany’s Rheinmetall, the U.S.'s Lockheed Martin and South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace to showcase their military equipment, including tanks, artillery systems and rocket launchers. The move is likely to deepen a monthslong diplomatic rift between France and Israel, that culminated when Paris recognized Palestinian statehood in September last year. In March, Israel announced it would stop all defense procurement from France. On Monday, the French government sharply condemned Israel’s assault in Lebanon and called for a U.N. Security Council emergency meeting.

It’s not the first time that France, which hosts some of Europe’s largest land, naval and air shows, has barred Israeli companies from attending. In 2024, the French government banned them from Eurosatory and naval arms show Euronaval over Israel’s war on Gaza, and from the Paris Air Show in June last year. “This is a disgraceful decision, one that reeks of political and commercial calculation,” the Israeli defense ministry said in its statement, hinting France was also banning Israeli companies because they’re competing with the French industry.

The annual exercise, held for more than five decades since 1971, brings together some 20 vessels from 15 nations with around 6,000 personnel - roughly half the size of last year’s drills - during a period of heightened tensions in the Baltic region. Officials say the smaller footprint reflects operational realities rather than waning commitment, as Western navies remain tied up in other areas including the Middle East’s Strait of Hormuz and the Arctic. The US BALTOPS naval exercise, which takes place from June 4 to June 20, will still be the biggest maneuver in the Baltic Sea this year, with Washington providing the flagship Mount Whitney vessel, despite months of fierce criticism of NATO by U.S. President Donald Trump and plans to cut U.S. commitments to the alliance. While the U.S.-led exercise is not designed as a direct response to current events, German Rear Admiral Stephan Haisch said the timing inevitably amplifies its political relevance. “In this period, it is a sign of the alliance’s strength, that a major exercise is being conducted, under U.S. leadership, with broad NATO participation”, he said. “It is a sign of the alliance’s unity and strength, and I am speaking of all allies here.”

I wonder how it feels to be a US commander and have to go on about “NATO unity” in all public statements while your commander-in-chief is constantly whining about NATO

As Commander Task Force Baltic, Haisch is in charge of a multinational naval headquarters for the Baltic Sea, established by Germany in the coastal city of Rostock in 2024 amid a growing focus on the area as tensions with Russia grew. His headquarters is capable of leading NATO operations in the Baltic Sea during a conflict with Russia and will do so for the upcoming US BALTOPS drills which are traditionally planned by the U.S.

Securing vital sea routes

BALTOPS will begin with drills in the western Baltic before shifting eastward to rehearse resupply and protection of free sea routes around the Swedish island of Gotland - a core task for NATO as the region’s strategic importance has grown. Open sea routes are seen as critical, particularly for supplying the Baltic states - linked only by a narrow land corridor to NATO’s mainland - in a crisis. “Free sea lines of communication - that is central,” Haisch said, pointing to the need to safeguard military logistics as well as commercial shipping. Asked about past incidents in the Baltics attributed to Russia by Western officials, Haisch said he did not expect Moscow to cross a threshold that would trigger NATO’s collective defense clause, known as Article 5, even as tensions remain elevated. “I would assume Russia to stay below the Article 5 threshold if they seek to test us.”

Australia will receive three in-service nuclear-powered submarines from the United States under a revised AUKUS agreement, replacing an earlier plan that included a mix of new and used vessels. According to an AFP report, the change was announced during discussions between defence leaders from Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom at the Shangri-La Dialogue security summit in Singapore. The updated arrangement is part of efforts to simplify Australia’s acquisition of Virginia-class submarines under the AUKUS security partnership. The programme is a key component of Australia’s long-term defence strategy and is expected to significantly enhance the country’s naval capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region. According to the report, Australian defence minister and Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles described the revised plan as a more practical and cost-effective approach to what is already one of the country’s most expensive defence projects.

Streamlining the submarine programme

Under the original agreement, Australia was expected to acquire at least three Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the US over the next 15 years, including two used vessels and one newly built submarine. However, the three AUKUS partners have now agreed that Australia will instead receive three submarines already in service with the US Navy. Officials said the move would simplify training, maintenance and supply chain requirements because all three vessels will be of the same type and configuration. In a joint statement, Marles, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and UK Defence Secretary John Healey said the revised arrangement would streamline Australia’s submarine acquisition process while improving operational efficiency and reducing overall costs.

Cost concerns and production challenges

The AUKUS submarine programme is expected to cost Australia up to $235 billion over the next three decades. Australian officials have been looking for ways to manage costs while ensuring the project remains on schedule, the report said. The decision also comes as US shipyards face difficulties meeting production targets for new Virginia-class submarines. The US Navy currently operates 24 vessels in the class, but manufacturers have struggled to achieve the goal of producing two new submarines annually.

Debate in the US

The revised agreement may also help address concerns surrounding submarine availability. According to the report, critics in the US have questioned whether Washington should transfer nuclear-powered submarines to Australia while its own navy faces capability and production pressures. Despite these concerns, the AUKUS countries have reaffirmed their commitment to the programme, viewing it as a central pillar of security cooperation among the three countries and a key element of their long-term strategic planning in the Indo-Pacific.

With 830 interceptors funded through mandatory appropriations, the plan would significantly increase the Army’s ability to sustain missile defense operations during a prolonged conflict. The expansion strengthens the resilience of the U.S. layered air and missile defense architecture and reflects the increasing importance of countering large-scale missile attacks in future high-intensity warfare. According to FY2027 U.S. Army acquisition documents, the request is among the largest THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) interceptor procurements ever proposed by the service. The investment underscores the increasing importance of strategic missile defense as the Pentagon prepares for potential high-intensity operations against near-peer adversaries, particularly China.

THAAD, short for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, is the U.S. military’s premier ground-based ballistic missile defense system designed to engage incoming missiles both inside and outside the Earth’s atmosphere during the final stage of flight. Each THAAD battery combines AN/TPY-2 radar, fire control systems, launchers, and hit-to-kill interceptors capable of destroying ballistic missile threats through direct collision. The system provides a critical upper-tier defensive layer, complementing Patriot air and missile defense systems by engaging threats at greater altitudes and longer ranges. THAAD remains one of the most advanced ballistic missile defense systems operated by the United States. Developed by Lockheed Martin, the system is designed to intercept short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during the terminal phase of flight using hit-to-kill technology. Unlike conventional air defense missiles equipped with explosive warheads, THAAD interceptors destroy incoming threats through direct kinetic impact, providing a highly effective capability against ballistic missile attacks.

The scale of the FY2027 request signals a significant shift in U.S. Army missile defense planning. Historically, THAAD interceptor procurement has been relatively limited due to the system’s specialized mission and high acquisition cost. The proposed purchase of 857 interceptors, therefore, represents not only replenishment of existing stocks but also a substantial increase in the Army’s capacity to sustain missile defense operations during prolonged crises or major conflicts. The request comes as U.S. military planners place growing emphasis on the Indo-Pacific theater, where China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force has developed one of the world’s largest inventories of conventional ballistic missiles. Over the past two decades, Beijing has fielded increasingly capable missile systems designed to threaten U.S. forces, allied military installations, logistics hubs, and critical infrastructure throughout the Western Pacific. Among the most significant challenges are China’s DF-21 and DF-26 ballistic missiles, which enable the People’s Liberation Army to conduct long-range, precision strikes against regional targets. These systems are intended to complicate U.S. force deployment and sustainment during a conflict by targeting air bases, ports, command centers, and other key military facilities. Expanding THAAD interceptor inventories directly strengthens U.S. forces’ ability to defend these assets and maintain operational effectiveness under missile attack.

The procurement also reflects broader lessons learned from recent conflicts and war-gaming assessments conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense. Military planners increasingly recognize that future high-intensity warfare could involve sustained missile campaigns that require significantly larger interceptor inventories than those maintained in previous decades. The ability to absorb repeated attacks while continuing defensive operations has become a central requirement for modern missile defense forces. Beyond protecting U.S. military installations, additional THAAD interceptors would enhance the credibility of America’s regional security commitments. THAAD batteries already contribute to missile defense missions in key locations such as Guam and South Korea, while supporting the broader integrated air and missile defense architecture that protects U.S. forces and allies. Larger interceptor stockpiles would improve readiness and reduce the risk of inventory shortfalls during extended operations. The proposed acquisition aligns with ongoing Pentagon efforts to build a layered missile defense network integrating THAAD with Patriot air and missile defense systems, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities, the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), and future regional defense initiatives. This architecture is intended to provide multiple opportunities to defeat incoming threats while increasing the survivability of forward-deployed forces.

The industrial implications of the procurement are equally significant. A production order of this magnitude would support sustained manufacturing activity across the U.S. missile defense industrial base and could drive further investments in production capacity. As global demand for advanced missile defense systems continues to grow, maintaining robust interceptor manufacturing capabilities has become a strategic priority for both the Pentagon and Congress. The FY2027 THAAD request ultimately highlights how missile defense is becoming a central component of U.S. deterrence strategy in the Indo-Pacific. By dramatically increasing interceptor inventories, the U.S. Army is preparing for an operational environment in which ballistic missile attacks may be a defining feature of future conflicts. The planned acquisition of 857 THAAD interceptors demonstrates Washington’s determination to ensure that U.S. forces and allies can withstand sustained missile campaigns while preserving freedom of action across one of the world’s most strategically important regions.